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A CITY IN TERROR. By Francis Russell. New York: The Viking
Press, Inc., 1975. Pp. 256. $10.00
In the past decade, the greatest phenomena in the field of labor
relations in the United States has been the rapid growth of the
organization of public employees into structures for collective bar-
gaining. The growth of this organization has established a pace that
has no parallel in the private sector. For example, in the State of
New York there are approximately one million public employees.'
Of this number, approximately 60 percent are members of employee
organizations. This is a rate of organization that more than doubles
the extent of organization in the private sector. The raison d'etre for
this disparity is significant, but it is not within the scope of this
reviewer's franchise. For the purpose of this review it is sufficient
to say that today's public employees have obviously concluded that
enhancement of terms and conditions of employment can only be
achieved through the negotiating process.
The posture of public employees, though seemingly accepted
today by the body politic, was in 1919 (the time period dealt with
in A City in Terror) an unthinkable concept insofar as it impinged
upon the sovereignty of government. Moreover, it was deemed at
that time, that public employees were public servants who had no
right to withdraw their services. Therefore, many persons main-
tained that any attempt to persuade public employees to the con-
trary was the result of the importation of foreign ideologies operat-
ing to the detriment of American democracy. In this atmosphere, I
shall consider the subject of the book-the Boston police strike in
1919.
The author, prior to considering the events leading up to the
strike, attempts to portray the national scene. He recounts the ef-
forts of soviets qua socialists to export the Russian Revolution to
America and the involvement of such activists in the police strike
in Seattle, Washington and in the textile mill strike in Lawrence,
Massachusetts. He also notes the involvement of known socialists
or radicals-Ben Gitlow, Carlo Tresca, and James Larkin. The
thrust of national observation was that such strikes were not only
an economic or industrial dispute; but also were part of an effort to
establish soviet governments in the United States. This review will
1. These include employees of the state and political subdivisions thereof.
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not dispute the contention that there were efforts by some, although
an insignificant number, in 1919 to sovietize American institutions,
but it does not appear that this was a significant factor in the events
that gave rise to the Boston police strike.
The strike can be best understood in the light of the circum-
stances surrounding the administration of the Boston Police Depart-
ment. Such understanding does not mandate the input of extra-
neous philosophies or movements.
In 1885 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assumed control
over the Boston Police Department. This move, in the opinion of the
author, was to ensure "Yankee control" over the department and to
put the department beyond the control of the "Celtic intruders."2
However, the Massachusetts governor selected a Celt, Stephen
O'Meara, as the first police commissioner. O'Meara was an enlight-
ened administrator. As a disciplinarian, he was strict but under-
standing. He encouraged the police to organize into a club through
which they could air their grievances. Under O'Meara, the Boston
police were described as "physically finer than West Point Cadets"3
and as "the most law abiding and law conscious in the country."4
O'Meara died in December, 1918; the author observes that if
O'Meara had lived, a police strike would never have occurred and
that under O'Meara's replacement a strike was inevitable. This
observation is well taken. But it is essential to consider the eco-
nomic condition of the Boston policeman at the end of 1918 in order
to isolate the true cause of this strike.
A recruit's annual wage was $730 (or $2.00 per day). The wages
would increase to $1,400 after six years, but the policemen were
responsible for securing their uniforms at a cost of $200. These fig-
ures become significant in comparison to other employees. Due to
the war time inflation, the wage rate of a policeman was only one-
half that of a carpenter, two-thirds that of a city laborer, and less
than that of a street car conductor.
When this disparity was brought to the attention of the new police
commissioner, his response was in essence that anyone who was
dissatisfied with the pay rate could resign. The veracity of such a
2. The author attributes this action to the fact that a person of Irish descent had been
elected Mayor of Boston.
3. F. RUSSELL, A CiTy IN TERROR 40 (1975).
4. Id. at 41.
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statement is clear but its efficacy is doubtful.
The police sought an increase of $200 per year but it was not
granted. In an effort to obtain bargaining leverage, the police voted
in August, 1919 to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor
(AFL). Boston's police commissioner while acknowledging the right
of the Boston police to organize issued an order prohibiting affilia-
tions with outside organizations. This action was most assuredly
directed against the proposed affiliation with the AFL. The Com-
missioner's sole objection was not the validity of the grievances of
the police but the proposed affiliation with a labor organization.
Most importantly, the Governor of Massachusetts, Calvin Coolidge,
intervened at this time by endorsing the commissioner's position.
The specific issue which gave rise to the subsequent strike was the
threatened discipline of eight policemen for affiliating with an out-
side union.
A citizens committee intervened and recommended that (a) po-
licemen should not affiliate with an outside union; (b) that those
who participated in such affiliation would not be disciplined; and
(c) that wages of police would be reviewed. These recommendations
provided a basis for the resolution of the dispute.' However, they
were unacceptable to the police commissioner. Throughout this cri-
sis, Governor Coolidge kept a very low profile and indicated that he
should not be "annoyed" even though the police commissioner was
a gubernatorial appointee. The Governor maintained this blaise at-
titude throughout the dispute. The eight officers were subsequently
suspended and the strike began.
A strike by policemen is a most traumatic experience whether it
takes place in 1919, or 1969, or 1975. It is worthy of note that the
experience of the 1919 strike in Boston was comparable to the expe-
rience of Montreal in 1969, since both experiences resulted in the
complete breakdown of "law and order." Looting and personal as-
saults were commonplace; personal rights were also violated. In
brief, the veneer of civilization was proven to be extraordinarily
thin. There is nothing to indicate that an experience in 1975 would
be any different.
Therefore, the Boston experience warrants a conclusion that a
strike by policemen cannot be tolerated. But this conclusion also
5. The frustration of Boston's Mayor in response to this attitude was such that he report-
edly struck the Governor.
1975l
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warrants a concomitant resolution that government must provide a
means of resolving inequities involvimg public safety employees so
as to avoid the need for detrimental self-help activities by such
employees. Simply stated, a viable alternative carrying the same
bargaining leverage of a strike must be devised.
The summary of the events in this book indicates that Governor
Coolidge avoided his responsibility in this most crucial dispute. Yet,
his inaction was such as to impel him into the presidency of the
United States. Coolidge's conduct, interpreted by most Americans
at the time, was that of a man who would not tolerate anarchy.
One cannot read this book without realizing that the Boston Po-
licemen had grievances-grievances of a nature that required a re-
sponse. Such a response did not have to admit the merits of the
grievance; it simply had to indicate that such grievances would
receive consideration.
It is the opinion of this reviewer that the Boston police strike of
1919 could have been averted. Further, in retrospect, it seems that
the mantle of a hero should not have been conferred upon Mr.
Coolidge. Rather it should be noted that if Mr. Coolidge had not
engaged in the "ostrich syndrome" (ignoring the grievances of the
Boston police) the strike might have been avoided. Mr. Coolidge
might not have been President, but he would have posthumously
achieved recognition as a man who would deal with inequities and
demand their resolution.
It has been long recognized that the basic reason that employees
have organized into an organization to deal with their employer is
the need to be recognized as human beings. Human dignity is a
most important factor in labor relations. This is a factor that Mr.
Coolidge did not recognize, and the horrendous results of the 1919
strike should be recorded as a failure of Mr. Coolidge to the same
degree that blame has been assessed upon the strikers. A person can
not be driven into the ground by reason of unfair and inequitable
conduct of an employer, and thereafter permit an employer, because
of the essential characteristic of the employee services, to decry the
lack of concern for public safety in the event of a strike. Rather,
public employees should take appropriate measures to provide for
the resolution of grievances in order to avoid the basis for the type
of self-help activities engaged in by the Boston policemen of 1919.
In summary, this historical review of the police strike of 1919
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should be read not only in recognition of the fact that a police strike
cannot be tolerated, but also as an example that essential employees
must be accorded a procedure (outside of the strike) which permits
their grievances to be heard and resolved.
Joseph R. Crowley*
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law and member of the New York State
Public Employment Relations Board.

